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Introduction
Systemic Risk (SR):
Property of systems of interconnected components:
Failure of a single entity (or small set of entities) can result in
a cascade of failures jeopardizing the whole system.
This happens in financial (i.e. interbank) systems:
⇒ Failure to manage systemic risk (SR) can be extremely
costly for society (e.g. financial crisis of 2007-2008)
Regulations proposed fail to address the fact that SR is a
network property (BASEL III. e.g. Tobin taxes, capital
requirements)
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cascades (e.g. Boss et al. (2004), Gai & Kapadia (2010),
Amini et al. (2013), Poledna et al. (2015))
Systemic risk can be quantified by DebtRank (Battiston et al.
(2012))
Similar to PageRank:
⇒ A page is important if many important pages point to it
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Systemically Risky institutions are exposed to it
DebtRank Ri of bank i: fraction of economic value in the
financial network that is lost following i’s default
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Observation: different loans (directed edges) have different
incremental effects on systemic risk
Question: how can we reorganize the network of exposures?
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Effect of a Particular Loan Exposure
Observation: different loans have different effects on
systemic risk
Question: how can we reorganize the network of exposures?
Answer: We can transfer an exposure from one bank to
another using a Credit Default Swap (CDS)
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A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a form of insurance against
default risk
A CDS transfers an exposure from one bank to another
⇒ it effectively rewires the network
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Multi-Layer Representation of Inter-Bank System
We need a multi-layer representation of interbank system
First layer represent net loan exposures
Second layer represent net CDS contracts between buyers and
sellers
⇒ interplay between different layers non-trivial.
Multilayer Network Mapped into a Single Layer
We can map the two layers into a single layer of effective exposures
Controlling Formation of Financial Network: CDS’s
Question: Can a regulator use CDS market to rewire the
financial network and reduce systemic risk?
Answer: Yes, by penalizing CDS transactions that increase
SR and encouraging those that decrease it
A bank normally pays an insurance premium (a ‘spread’) sm
to buy protection against default of bank m
Now it pays sij = sm + τij
τij is a systemic surcharge (i.e. a tax):
τij = ζ ·max
[
0,∆ELsyst
]
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Simulation with an ABM
We study a simple model:
Banks extend interbank loans to each other
They insure these loans with CDSs sold by other banks
Regulator imposes a surcharge τij on CDSs
Simulation with ABM
CRISIS agent-based model.
Modified with an interbank system for loans and derivatives
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